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______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Previous studies of fraud prevention and detection in Russian business environment 
have primarily targeted large-scale organizations. Meanwhile, small businesses are 
particularly vulnerable to deception due to lack of resources that large companies have 
to elaborate internal control. 
 
The purpose of this research is to identify effective methods to fight asset 
misappropriation, in particular billing, payroll and expense reimbursement schemes, in 
Russian small businesses. This is achieved by answering the following research 
questions: What measures do fraud experts recommend to prevent and detect billing, 
payroll and expense reimbursement schemes? What measures do Russian small 
businesses have in place to prevent and detect billing, payroll and expense 
reimbursement schemes? How do managers and accountants estimate effectiveness of 
the measures in preventing and detecting billing, payroll and expense reimbursement 
schemes? 
 
The data used in this study was gathered carrying out an analysis of the content of 
recent fraud literature and conducting an e-mail survey. A total of 14 small business 
managers and accountants responded to the questionnaire (response rate 100%). 
Because of non-random selection of the survey participants, there might be a difference 
between the results from the current study and the results from the entire population 
 
It was found that managers and accountants in small businesses believe the most 
effective fraud detection procedures are comparing purchase order with invoice and 
with shipping documents and confirming data with vendors/customers. They rate having 
restricted access to business records in organization as the most effective fraud 
prevention measure, while fraud detection training is viewed as the least effective 
measure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Background of the topic 
 
The research is motivated by the findings of several surveys separately conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). 
The 2011 study1 by PwC presents a picture on economic crime situation in Russia, 
where asset misappropriation2 is considered to be the most common type of violation. 
Although the research reveals a decline in the reported fraud incidents over the past few 
years, most respondents express concern of being economic crime victims. The survey 
data on the actual cases of violations and methods of their detection was obtained from 
Russian leading organizations of diverse sizes – those employing less than 1000 
persons, 1001 to 5000 persons, and over 5000 persons. 
 
At the same time, ACFE conducted a study3 of business security risks in Russian 
companies. The research reports on fraud4 as the most significant threat and source of 
losses in the entities, and presents rating of measures carried out by companies to 
combat violation. The survey data was received from employees of the most advanced 
entities in terms of business security technologies. The majority of the respondents 
worked in companies with more than 500 staff. 
 
The 2012 study5 by ACFE examines occupational fraud6 and methods to secure 
business from losses caused by illegal acts of staff members. The research has 
summarized information on offences occurred in different countries, which clearly 
indicates small businesses – organizations with fewer than 100 employees – have 
consistently experienced the greater percentage of the fraud cases than large companies. 
                                                   
1 http://www.pwc.ru/en_RU/ru/forensic-services/assets/Economic-survey-2011-Russia-en.pdf 
2 Theft or misuse of company assets. 
3 http://acfe-rus.org/ 
4 Intentional crime against company property, including corruption. 
5 http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/rttn/2012-report-to-nations.pdf 
6 The use of one’s occupation for personal financial gain through the deliberate misuse or misapplication 
of company resources or assets. 
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Despite the surveys address information to fraud and its detection, none of them 
sufficiently investigates methods that would help small entities to fight against 
violation. Small businesses are particularly vulnerable to deception due to lack of 
resources that large companies have to elaborate internal control7 (Johnson, Rudesill, 
2001; Wells, 2003; ACFE, 2012: 5). In addition, because of fewer funds, the losses 
from offences experienced by small entities tend to have a greater impact than they 
would in larger organizations (ACFE, 2012: 5). Nevertheless, the professional literature 
on fraud prevention and detection commonly targets a general business audience and 
rarely discloses such issue in the context of small enterprises. In particular, Bierstaker, 
Brody and Pacini (2006) present a list of anti-fraud methods that small entities may be 
unable to employ due to their high cost. Likewise, Vanasco (1998) in his extensive 
research provides a platform for fraud detection and deterrence procedures that could be 
carried out by internal auditors and top management, meaning larger organizations. 
 
Johnson and Rudesill (2001), although investigate topic in question in small businesses, 
come up with generalized defense practices and audit procedures aimed to prevent and 
detect a wide range of deceptions. Meanwhile, some violations may require special 
treatment. Therefore, a focus on individual fraud schemes can bring a certain 
concretization in the list of fraud prevention and detection methods. Additionally, 
looking into specific offences that pose a serious threat to the business can help define 
the areas that require immediate management’s attention in order to avoid losses. Since 
no paper examines in detail protection of small entities from fraud8, a research is needed 
to study measures, owners and managers of small enterprises can apply to prevent and 
detect the most likely violations. Furthermore, restricted amount of organization’s 
resources indicate the demand of using the “best” techniques to combat fraud, avoiding 
investments in costly control mechanisms. 
 
Based on the corporate fraud, forensic accounting and fraud auditing literature, this 
study concentrates on methods intended to secure small businesses from asset 
                                                   
7 According to the framework from the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO 1992), internal control is a process designed to provide reasonable assurance over 
the achievement of objectives concerning effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of 
financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
8 In this study, the term “fraud” refers to occupational/internal fraud, often called white-collar crime. 
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misappropriation, most prevalent deception within such entities (ACFE, 2012: 27). The 
topic is examined in the context of Russian business environment, as economic crime is 
and will remain a very serious risk for Russian organizations (PwC, 2011; ACFE, 
2011). The research investigates availability of anti-fraud measures in Russian small 
enterprises9 and perception of insiders about effectiveness10 of the measures in 
preventing and detecting violation. 
 
 
1.2. Purpose of the study 
 
The main purpose of the study is to identify effective methods to fight white-collar 
crime in Russian small businesses. It can be divided into three parts. The first sub-
purpose is to explore the common ways asset misappropriation schemes are prevented 
and detected. The second sub-purpose is to examine the use of anti-fraud methods in 
Russian small organizations. The third sub-purpose is to investigate opinions of 
managers and accountants regarding effectiveness of the methods in preventing and 
detecting illegal activities. 
 
The first part of this paper deals with policies and procedures aimed to protect 
companies from asset misappropriation. The section is built on the fraud theory, which 
defines asset misappropriation schemes and their characteristics alongside with the red 
flags11 associated with the deceptions (Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 94, 95). Anti-fraud 
policies and procedures are identified with the help of the red flag approach, which is 
based on searching for anomalies in business (Carmichael, Graham, Whittington, 2007: 
140). The paper comes up with a list of methods designed to detect the warning signals 
and reduce the risk of fraud occurrence. 
 
                                                   
9 According to Russian Federal Law № 209-FZ, 24 July 2007, small business comprises sole 
proprietorship, micro- and small-sized companies that meet criteria based on ownership structure, revenue 
volume and number of employees. In the current paper, “small enterprise” is referred to companies and 
sole proprietorship with fewer than 100 staff. 
10 The capability of producing a desired result. 
11 Traces of the criminal and crime left at the scene of the crime, or in the fraudster’s life. 
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The emphasis of the study is put on asset misappropriation, in particular cash 
misappropriation, due to its significant prevalence in the entities world-wide (ACFE, 
2012: 12). The following cash misappropriation schemes are examined: billing, payroll 
and expense reimbursement. The choice was made on the ground of several findings. 
All the offences belong to the fraudulent disbursement, which remains the largest 
defalcation scheme in accounting. Besides, within this category, billing, payroll and 
expense reimbursement are the dominant frauds perpetrated against small businesses 
(Gramling, Johnstone, Rittenberg, 2011: 453, 454; ACFE, 2012: 12, 27). The research 
excludes investigation of check tampering, as checks are not widely used in Russia, and 
their share in the total volume and value of payments does not exceed 1% (CPSS, 2011: 
303). 
 
The second part of this paper focuses on the employment of anti-fraud methods in 
Russian small enterprises and effectiveness of the methods in preventing and detecting 
white-collar crime. Based on the literature review, accountants and managers are asked 
to indicate anti-fraud policies and procedures used in their small organizations. In 
addition, respondents are asked to rate effectiveness of policies and procedures in 
combating illegal activities. The section results in a list of the most effective and 
ineffective fraud prevention and detection methods. 
 
Although studies on fraud prevention and detection are commonly based on the surveys 
of accounting practitioners, researches of this type may involve some risk of respondent 
bias. Accountants are likely to understand basic forensic accounting/audit terminology 
and are more likely than other specialists in small organization to answer the questions 
on combating fraud. However, at the same time, there is a possibility that, due to 
professional activity, respondents are competent in fraud detection rather than 
prevention, and therefore may rate effectiveness of defense practices superficially. 
Meanwhile, it is the responsibility of an organization’s management to design and 
review policies and procedures that will deter and/or detect illegal activities (Johnson, 
Rudesill, 2001). Hereby, questioning accountants alone cannot provide reliable 
information on what methods are effective in fighting white-collar crime. Therefore, the 
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participants of the current research include both accountants and managers from 
different organizations. 
 
The research question of this study is: What measures are effective in preventing and 
detecting billing, payroll and expense reimbursement schemes in Russian small 
businesses? 
 
The research sub-question 1 is: What measures do fraud experts recommend to prevent 
and detect billing, payroll and expense reimbursement schemes? 
 
The research sub-question 2 is: What measures do Russian small businesses have in 
place to prevent and detect billing, payroll and expense reimbursement schemes? 
 
The research sub-question 3 is: How do managers and accountants estimate 
effectiveness of the measures in preventing and detecting billing, payroll and expense 
reimbursement schemes? 
 
 
1.3. Contribution of the study 
 
Fraud can affect any organization, and its impact on reputation and financial health can 
be enormous. One of the most effective ways to deal with the growing threat of fraud is 
to understand the fraud concept, recognize red flags and be proactive about spotting 
business anomalies. In fact, many studies describe recognition of white-collar crime 
from the perspective of auditors and fraud examiners. However, small businesses often 
can not afford to hire internal auditor or conduct regular external audit, due to lack of 
funds. Therefore, owners and managers of small organizations hunt for information on 
common and inexpensive fraud prevention and detection methods. Meanwhile, a large 
number of fraud incidents shows a strong need for the research that proposes the “best” 
measures to fight illegal activities. 
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Covering the nature of fraud and its types, this study provides a list of fraud prevention 
and detection methods and their effectiveness ratings. The paper contributes to the 
existing research in several respects. First, the study examines policies and procedures 
intended to prevent and detect cash misappropriation schemes in Russian small 
businesses. Fraud itself has continued to prosper, while information on effective 
methods to fight it has largely dissipated. The current literature has gathered a big 
variety of anti-fraud measures employed in the entities worldwide. However, there is 
not much survey evidence about their effectiveness. Thus, this subject deserves more 
research attention. 
 
Additionally, the prior studies targeted mostly the largest companies, while the 
opportunity for fraud is greater in smaller organizations. In particular, Russian body of 
research (e.g., ACFE, 2011; PwC, 2009; 2011) does not provide information on the 
ways to combat white-collar crime in small entities. Meanwhile, according to statistical 
data12, 13 as of the end of 2010, small businesses make up a significant contribution to 
Russian economy and comprise a vast majority of the commercial organizations in the 
country. Thus, there is a room (and need) for further investigation into fraud prevention 
and detection, with a focus on small enterprises. 
 
Second, the research gathers information on simple checks that can be used by non-
fraud experts to prevent and detect violations. The study examines various audit 
procedures and addresses them to the fraud indicators, giving a tip about the anomaly to 
search for when applying a certain method. The research helps owners and managers of 
small businesses understand how certain types of fraud occur, what symptoms the 
schemes leave behind and how to prevent and recognize potential illegal activities. At 
the same time, the paper provides prescriptive information on what anti-fraud methods 
work the “best”. Business owners and managers may wish to consider investing in the 
methods in order to prevent common frauds in their organizations. 
 
Third, there is a lack of knowledge on the effectiveness of fraud prevention and 
detection techniques from the managers’ opinion. The earlier studies, such as Johnson 
                                                   
12 http://www.rcsme.ru/eng/common/totals.asp 
13 http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/13-01.htm 
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and Rudesill (2001), Brody and Pacini (2006), paid attention to the accounting 
practitioners’ estimation, despite the fact that establishing, maintaining and enforcing 
anti-fraud policies and procedures are the responsibility of the organization’s 
management (ISA 24014; SAS 9915). Moreover, Johnson and Rudesill (2001) in their 
work pointed out at the effectiveness of owners and managers in detecting illegal 
activities. Thereat, the present paper examines perception of both accounting and 
management practitioners. 
 
Fourth, the research overcomes some methodological limitations that belong to the prior 
studies. For example, Johnson and Rudesill (2001), while investigating occupational 
fraud in small businesses, did not define fraud in the survey instrument, making it 
possible that respondents might have included external fraudulent activities in 
formulating their answers. Brody and Pacini (2006), while gathering data on the use of 
fraud prevention and detection techniques, did not give explanation of fraud procedures 
and software in the questionnaire, thus, introducing a risk that study participants might 
have misunderstood specific forensic accounting/audit wordings. In this respect, the 
current research employs the survey instrument that provides basic fraud terminology, 
as well as interpretation of defense practices and audit procedures. 
 
Additionally, ACFE (2012), although included small businesses into the study, only 
focused briefly on the aspect of fraud prevention and detection and did not provide any 
guideline on the application of anti-fraud methods for organizations. On the contrary, 
this paper gives recommendations to small business owners and managers on the use of 
some cost-effective16 anti-fraud techniques. 
 
 
                                                   
14 International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 240, December 2009, “The Auditor’s Responsibilities 
Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements.” 
15 Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 99, October 2002, “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit.” 
16 Providing adequate results in relation to incurred costs. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The initial step in fighting against fraud is to understand its origin and characteristics. 
Therefore, at the beginning of this chapter a fraud theory is presented, defining the 
principles of fraud and essentials of fraud prevention and detection. The second section 
discloses characteristics of common cash misappropriation schemes along with the red 
flags associated with illegal activities and anti-fraud measures. The third section 
presents policies and procedures aimed to prevent and detect fraud in Russian small 
business environment. The fourth section summarizes findings derived from the 
theoretical chapter. 
 
 
2.1. Fraud theory 
 
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) in the Standard 1210.A2 presents fraud as a 
range of irregularities and illegal acts characterized by intentional deceit or 
misrepresentation. Fraud is perpetrated by a person outside and inside the organization 
for his or her benefit, for the benefit of the organization or another person. From the 
above definition, white-collar crime is seen as a dishonest act committed by insiders for 
their own purposes or enrichment, rather than for the enrichment of the organization on 
a whole, in spite of supposed corporate loyalty. The reasons why occupational fraud is 
common among trusted individuals can be found in behavioral theories of financial 
crime that explain individualistic aspects of natural phenomena (see Gottschalk, 2010: 
211-212). One of them, fraud theory, defines in detail conditions of the fraud risk. 
 
In the 1950s Donald Cressey developed the fraud triangle model, explaining the factors 
that cause individual to commit occupational fraud (see Figure 1). Cressey concluded 
that there are three requirements for fraud to occur: incentive or pressure (e.g., a need 
for money), opportunity (e.g., weaknesses in internal controls17) and personal 
characteristics or rationalization (e.g., willingness to commit fraud). The incentive to 
commit fraud is associated with personal pressures and/or corporate pressures on the 
                                                   
17 A set of policies and procedures to prevent wrong actions from occurring (COSO, 1992). 
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individual. Opportunity appears when there is an easy access to company’s assets or 
when an individual manages a control procedure that assists in accomplishing a deceit. 
One’s job position, responsibilities and authorization also contribute to the opportunity 
to commit fraud. Personal characteristics imply an attitude, character, or set of ethical 
values that enables an individual to justify a dishonest act (Vona, 2008: 7-8). To sum 
up, occupational fraud is most prevalent in organizations that have no controls, no 
ethical standards and no profits. Likewise, the more these conditions exist, the higher 
the risk of fraud. 
 
 
Figure 1. The fraud triangle (Wells, 2001) 
 
The variety of fraud schemes is connected to the opportunity dimension of the triangle. 
Each fraud scheme occurs differently in each organization and industry, but its 
fundamental mechanics stays the same for all enterprises. Every single fraud scheme 
has a unique characteristics and concealment strategy that enables an individual to hide 
the fraudulent transaction. However, the way to implement the strategy can vary on 
one’s position and company’s internal controls. Each concealment strategy has related 
red flags that indicate a potential for a fraud scheme (Vona, 2008: 9-10, 13-14). They 
include accounting anomalies (e.g., incorrect ledger balances), analytical irregularities 
(e.g., inventory shortages), internal control weakness (e.g., a lack of proper 
authorization), changes in person’s behavior or lifestyle, tips and complaints that 
something is wrong (Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 95-96; Carmichael, Graham, 
Whittington, 2007: 129-130). 
 
The presence of red flags does not necessarily mean that fraud takes place, and can be 
provoked by non-fraud factors (Krambia-Kardis, 2002). For instance, unusual increase 
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in accounts receivable may be the result of deception, or may appear due to financial 
difficulties of major customers (Burke, Cooper, Tomlinson, 2010: 182). Therefore, the 
process of fraud detection centers on looking for anomalies in business and 
investigating whether signals observed represent actual violation or are the result of 
other events (Carmichael, Graham, Whittington, 2007: 140). 
 
To have a high probability of fraud detection, owners and managers need to understand 
as many red flags as possible. General red flags, such as employee’s change in lifestyle 
or behavior, tips and complaints that something is wrong, although indicate a fraud, are 
not necessarily connected to a specific violation. Therefore, an identification of those 
red flags associated with particular fraud schemes is even more important. A thorough 
understanding and analysis of such warning signals assist in developing potentially 
effective detection methods for certain types of violations (Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 
111-112, 155). 
 
Meanwhile, preventing fraud seems to be more desirable for organizations than 
detecting it. According to Treadway Commission findings, the most effective way to 
protect business from white-collar crime is to install a strong set of internal controls. 
The model developed by the group has come to be known as the COSO Model of 
Internal Controls. It focuses on five key areas: 
 
1) control environment – a component that sets a fundamental discipline and 
structure of the organization’s internal control system; 
2) risk assessment – a process that involves identification, analysis and assessment 
of risks in the achievement of entity’s objectives; 
3) control activities – practices, policies and procedures that help ensure 
management directives are carried out; 
4) information and communication – systems and reports that enable individuals to 
carry out their responsibilities; 
5) monitoring – an external overview of internal controls. 
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Controls restrict the opportunity to commit fraud and warn potential fraudsters that 
management is actively monitoring the business that in turn deters illegal activities 
(Carmichael, Graham, Whittington, 2007: 128). However, unlike big enterprises, small 
entities may not need such internal control structure due to its costs and operational 
complexity. Nevertheless, owners and managers of small organizations still need to 
develop anti-fraud policies and procedures to prevent wrong actions from occurring. 
 
The following section looks into billing, payroll and expense reimbursement schemes. 
Besides description of fraud categories and particular manipulations, the part presents 
the red flags associated with the schemes and ways to combat illegal activities. The 
research moves away from the general (environmental, cultural, and corporate) anti-
fraud measures and concentrates on specific policies and procedures. The section lists 
defense practices that serve to minimize the risk of fraud in organizations (Vona, 2008: 
225), and audit procedures that assist in searching for the fraud indicators sufficient to 
warrant recommending an investigation. 
 
 
2.2. Asset misappropriation 
 
Asset misappropriation involves converting to personal use company’s assets (Johnson, 
Rudesill, 2001). The fraud is conducted by employees, against the organization, for the 
benefit of the perpetrator (Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 56, 62). While such detriment 
may seem insignificant on the daily basis, it can cause serious long-term damages over a 
period (Lasko, 2009). In 1996 ACFE in the Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud 
and Abuse18 presented the asset misappropriation chart, which is now known as the 
“fraud tree” (see Figure 2). 
 
Assets that employees misappropriate can be divided into two groups: cash, inventory 
and all other assets. Most illegal schemes involve cash account, as cash is fungible and 
easy to transport (Wells, 2001). Such schemes are not limited to the theft of currency on 
hand  
                                                   
18 http://www.acfe.com/documents/Report_to_the_Nation.pdf 
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Figure 2. The fraud tree (ACFE, 2012) 
 
hand, and imply complicated manipulations with checks and other financial 
instruments. Cash frauds can be divided into schemes related to cash receipts, cash on 
hand and cash disbursements (ACFE, 2012: 7). 
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Fraudulent disbursement is considered to be the most expensive cash fraud scheme, 
which implies disbursement of organization’s funds caused by employee through some 
trick or device (Wells, 2003; 2004). The key feature of this crime lies in the former, an 
employee takes cash from the employer as if it is a legitimate transaction (Singleton, 
Singleton, 2010: 86). Fraudulent disbursements can be categorized into billing schemes, 
payroll schemes, expense reimbursement schemes, check tampering and register 
disbursements (ACFE, 2012: 7). 
 
 
2.2.1. Billing schemes 
 
Billing schemes imply a false invoice (i.e., invoice for fictitious goods or services, 
inflated invoice, or invoice for personal purchases) submitted by employee the company 
unknowingly pays to the benefit of the thief (Wells, 2003; 2004; ACFE, 2012). Such 
fraud can be perpetrated through the use of a shell company scheme, non-accomplice 
vendor scheme or personal purchases scheme (ACFE, 2012: 7). 
 
A shell company is an entity without active business purpose, typically created for 
conducting an illegal activity. The company has no physical address, no employees, and 
does not have any goods or services to offer. However, it is legally incorporated, and 
files tax returns (Vona, 2008: 83). In a shell company scheme an employee sets up a 
fictitious company causing his employer to pay for its non-existed goods or services 
(Goldmann, Kaufman, 2009: 27). The fraud is accomplished by submitting a false 
invoice, approving the invoice, issuing payment to the shell vendor, and intercepting the 
payment by the fraudster or an accomplice (Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 87). The 
scheme goes beyond the invoices for fictitious goods and services, and also includes 
inflated invoices. In this case, employee orders merchandise from the legitimate vendor, 
and then by setting up the pseudo vendor sells the goods to his employer at the inflated 
price (Goldmann, Kaufman, 2009: 29). 
 
In order to prevent a shell company scheme from occurring, the duties in the purchasing 
process should be separated, i.e., different people are responsible for requisitioning 
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goods or services, purchasing, approving purchases, issuing and recording related 
payments, and receiving the merchandise (Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 123; Wells, 
2011: 204). Such measure deters employee from having too much control over the 
process and thus, decreases an opportunity to commit the offence (Coenen, 2008: 154; 
COSO, 2006: 5). 
 
As the scheme deals with invoicing from fictitious vendors, it is important to maintain 
and regularly update an approved vendor list19. Before adding a new vendor to the list, 
entity’s legitimacy must be verified by someone independent of the purchasing function 
(Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 329). Verification can be done, for instance, by 
obtaining company’s corporate records and other relevant documents (Wells, 2002). 
Apparently, an invoice from the entity that is not on the approved vendor list might 
indicate the fraud. A simple comparison made between invoices and the accounts 
payable list of vendors can reveal the red flag (Goldmann, Kaufman, 2009: 47, 82). 
 
Sometimes perpetrators may use their own home address, initials or bank account when 
setting up a shell entity. Therefore, any matches between employee data and vendor 
data might indicate an existence of phantom company. By comparing relevant data, a 
victim entity can detect the fraud signal (Vona, 2008: 86-87; Coenen, 2008: 81). 
 
In a shell company scheme a dishonest employee usually bills his employer for services 
rather than goods. Purchases of fictitious goods cause inventory shortages as the items 
appear only in the company’s inventory system. By conducting a stock-taking, i.e., 
comparing physical inventory to purchases, an employer can easily reveal non-existed 
merchandise. Fictitious services are more difficult to trace due to their intangibility. 
However, such purchases cause an increase in the service-related expenses that can 
serve as an indicator of the scheme. Other red flags associated with the fraudulent 
purchases include unusual or unexpected growth in cost of goods sold and average unit 
price of items acquired. This kind of anomaly can be detected through trend analysis, 
                                                   
19 A list of vendors considered as acceptable to buy from. Each approved vendor has a file, containing key 
information about company (Goldmann, Kaufman, 2009: 47, 52). In this study, the term approved vendor 
list, also referred to as accounts payable list of vendors, includes both list of vendors and relevant files. 
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i.e., comparison of the same financial data on a year-to-year basis (Kranacher, Riley, 
Wells, 2010: 328-330; Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 105). 
 
There are certain signals that indicate a potential for shell company invoices. They 
include a lack of information on the invoice and sequential invoice numbers from a 
vendor. Detection of the fraud indicators can be conducted through the review of 
invoices sorted according to the vendor and document number. Additional attention 
should be paid to the quantities and types of goods and services the company purchases. 
Odd items on the invoices and high level of purchases might signal a fraudulent activity. 
By monitoring the nature and quantities of goods and services acquired, an employer 
can detect the red flags (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 329-330). 
 
In a non-accomplice vendor scheme an employee intentionally mishandles payments 
intended for a legitimate vendor. For instance, the perpetrator double-pays an invoice on 
purpose, then requests to return one of the payments and intercepts it. Similarly, the 
fraudster intentionally pays the wrong vendor or pays the proper one, but purposely 
overpays him. Also an employee might overbill a victim company by submitting a fake 
invoice in the name of a legitimate vendor with further interception of the payment 
(Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 331). Another version of the scheme is to order 
merchandise not needed, then return the merchandise to the vendor and pocket the 
refund (Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 87). 
 
When submitting a fake bill in the name of a legitimate company, the perpetrator might 
change the vendor’s data, in order to collect the payment. By reviewing the accounts 
payable list of vendors, an employer can reveal data mismatch. In addition, a counterfeit 
invoice might have a significantly out of sequence number, which is easily detected 
when sorting invoice numbers from a particular vendor. Instead of producing fake bills, 
a dishonest employee may rerun invoices from the legitimate vendors and intercept the 
payment resulted from the second run. In this case, duplicate invoice numbers can be 
detected through the review of paid invoice data. To prevent the fraud, a victim entity 
can use the same methods as in a shell company scheme – segregation of duties in the 
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purchasing process and maintenance of an approved vendor list (Kranacher, Riley, 
Wells, 2010: 332). 
 
In a personal purchases scheme an employee causes his employer to pay for personal 
items (Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 87). Usually the fraud is committed through 
submission of false invoices. The perpetrator buys an item, and then presents the bill to 
the employer as if the acquisition has been made on behalf of the company. Another 
way to make personal purchases with the employer’s money involves the misuse of 
entity credit cards (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 333, 336). 
 
To accomplish the scheme, fraudsters may change the delivery address for supplies, so 
that the merchandise would arrive directly to their home or business. Therefore, 
shipments to locations other than company are a potential fraud signal. By reviewing 
invoices, an employer can detect address discrepancy (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 
333, 339). Other red flags associated with the deception involve purchases of unusual 
items that have no business purpose and increase in expenditures. Examination of 
invoices (Vona, 2008: 101) or an independent review of the credit card statement can 
reveal the acquisition of goods in question, while trend analysis of vendor payments can 
uncover an unexplained tendency (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 337; Wells, 2011: 
200). 
 
In order to prevent the fraud, the duties in the purchasing process should be properly 
segregated, so that no one could approve the acquisition of personal items (Kranacher, 
Riley, Wells, 2010: 333). Establishing maximum purchasing limits for each employee 
(Wells, 2002) may not deter the scheme from occurring, but can restrict damages from 
deception (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 337). Table 1 summarizes the red flags 
associated with the billing schemes and methods of fraud prevention and detection. 
 
 
2.2.2. Payroll schemes 
 
Payroll schemes involve false claims for compensation submitted by employee the 
company 
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Table 1. Billing schemes 
Red flags Prevention methods Detection methods 
 Matches between an 
employee’s home 
address/initials/bank 
account and vendor’s 
address/name/bank account 
 Inventory shortages 
 Unusual or unexplained 
increase in cost of goods 
sold/service-related 
expenses/average unit price 
of items acquired/vendor 
payments 
 Sequential invoice 
numbers from a vendor 
 Out of sequence invoice 
numbers from a vendor 
 Duplicate invoice 
numbers from a vendor 
 Lack of detail on invoice 
 Unusually high level of 
purchases 
 Delivery address for 
purchases is different from  
the business address 
 Purchases of unusual 
items 
 Invoice from the vendor 
that is not on the approved 
vendor list 
 Mismatch in vendor’s 
data 
 Segregation of duties 
between requisitioning 
goods or services, 
purchasing, approving 
purchases, issuing and 
recording related payments, 
and receiving the 
merchandise 
 Maintaining and regularly 
updating an approved 
vendor list 
 Independent verification 
of entity’s legitimacy 
before adding a new vendor 
to the approved vendor list 
 Segregation of duties 
between adding a new 
vendor to the approved 
vendor list and approving 
purchases 
 Establishing maximum 
purchasing limits for each 
employee 
 Comparing vendor data 
with employee data 
 Stock-taking 
 Trend analysis 
 Sorting invoices by 
vendor and invoice number 
 Examination of 
invoices/review of the credit 
card statement 
 Monitoring the nature and 
quantities of goods and 
services acquired 
 Comparing invoices with 
approved vendor list 
 
company pays. The deception can be committed through ghost employee scheme, 
commission scheme, or falsified wages scheme (ACFE, 2012: 7, 12). Unlike billing 
frauds, payroll schemes imply disbursements to employees rather than to external 
parties (Wells, 2011: 208). 
 
Ghost employees are individuals presented on the payroll20, who are not providing 
services, but who are receiving payment (Vona, 2008: 145). The ghost can be a real 
person or a fictitious one invented by the perpetrator. The most common way to commit 
                                                   
20 A form that contains a list of employees and amount of compensation that is due each pay period. 
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a ghost employee scheme implies adding a ghost employee to the payroll, approving a 
time sheet21 or salary, issuing paycheck to the ghost, and intercepting the paycheck by 
the fraudster or an accomplice (Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 88). 
 
When creating a ghost employee, the fraudster might fail to provide certain details (e.g., 
social security number, physical address, phone number, etc.), the omission of which is 
a red flag. Also a purely fictitious employee may have the same home address or bank 
account as the perpetrator. The fact that two employees are receiving payments at the 
same destination, have the same social security number or contact data may indicate the 
existence of a ghost on the payroll (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 361, 362). 
Paychecks for employees who do not have any deductions or taxes withheld, who never 
take a vacation or sick leave, and who have a date of paycheck after termination, also 
represent a fraud signal (Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 107). Examination of payroll files22 
by someone independent of the payroll function can detect all these warning signs 
(Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 362; Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 152). 
 
Reconciliation of employees in the payroll database with employees in the human 
resources database can reveal ghosts - persons on the payroll who have no personnel 
file23 (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 362; Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 168). 
Unexplained or unusual increase in wages expense - a signal of fraudulent activity - is 
easily detected through trend analysis (Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 107). 
 
One of the basic methods to prevent a ghost employee scheme involves segregation of 
duties. In particular, hiring function should be separated from other payroll duties, so 
that no one could add a ghost employee to the payroll. By conducting background and 
reference checks before hiring (e.g., verifying educational credentials of a candidate), an 
employer can eliminate most ghost employee schemes (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 
362). 
 
                                                   
21 A sheet that records actual number of hours worked by an employee during a pay period (Wells, 2011: 
215). 
22 The employee payroll file is the repository for all records related to an employee’s paycheck. 
23 A file that contains all records related to an employee’s employment. 
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Commission is a form of compensation taken as a percentage from sales generated by 
employee. There are two factors that influence the amount of the commissioned wages: 
the size of generated sales and the percentage of those sales paid to an employee 
(Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 365). To falsely increase the pay, and thus to perpetrate 
a commission scheme, a fraudster may use one of the following methods: generate 
bogus sales, overstate sales, or increase the commission rate (Singleton, Singleton, 
2010: 88). 
 
One of the ways to detect a commission scheme is to examine correlation between sales 
figures and commission expenses. If commission expenses increase as a percentage of 
total sales, that might be a red flag. When a perpetrator commits the scheme, the 
commissions he/she earned will tend to be higher compared to the coworkers. By 
running a comparative analysis of commission earned by each employee, a victim entity 
can reveal the fraud signal (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 367). At the same time, 
trend analysis can assist in monitoring changes in commission expenses, increase of 
which might be a warning sign (Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 108). 
 
When the perpetrator creates fictitious sales to manipulate the pay, the sales usually stay 
uncollected. By tracking down uncollected sales generated by each employee, an 
employer can define if one has extremely bigger amount of these sales compared to the 
coworkers. In addition, getting independent data confirmation from customers can 
uncover both fictitious and overstated sales (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 367). 
 
To change the commission rate, and thus to commit the scheme, the fraudster may need 
to alter payroll or personnel files. Therefore, the access to such records should be off-
limits to employees who receive commissioned wages (ACFE, 2007: 1.564). 
 
Falsified wages scheme implies usage of the falsified hours worked and salary scheme 
(Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 88). For hourly employees, two main factors affect the size 
of a paycheck: the number of hours worked and the rate of pay. To fraudulently increase 
the size of wages, a perpetrator falsifies one of these elements. For salaried employees, 
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the most common way to generate fraudulent wages is to increase the rate of pay 
(Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 362). 
 
When the rate of pay is falsely altered, mismatch between payroll and personnel data 
might appear. Such kind of anomaly can be detected by verifying the rates of pay in a 
pay period or for an employee over pay periods, i.e., comparing rates paid with the 
approved ones stored in the personnel files. Unexpected increase in wages expense is 
another red flag associated with the scheme, which can be uncovered by performing 
trend analysis. Verification of hours worked, i.e., comparison between hours paid and 
hours presented on employee time sheets, can show whether false amount is paid to an 
individual (Singleton, Singleton, 2010: 108, 153). 
 
Other tests that can highlight falsified hours and salary schemes include running 
comparison reports of overtime generated by employee and making comparison 
between payroll expenses and budget projections. Such controls can reveal variations 
from budgeted expenses and detect whether a particular individual has significantly 
bigger amount of overtime paid compared to the coworkers (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 
2010: 365). 
 
In order to prevent most instances of falsified hours and salary schemes, payroll 
preparation, approval, disbursement, distribution and reconciliation functions should be 
strictly segregated. Policy, requiring a supervisor’s approval of overtime work, pay 
changes, sick leave and vacation time, should be in place as well. In addition, 
maintaining restricted access to employee time sheets can prevent false alterations of 
hours worked (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 365; Wells, 2011: 239; Bragg, 2009: 
203). Table 2 sums up the red flags associated with the payroll schemes and methods of 
fraud prevention and detection. 
 
 
2.2.3. Expense reimbursement schemes 
 
Expense reimbursement schemes imply submission of a claim made by employee to 
reimburse 
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Table 2. Payroll schemes 
Red flags Prevention methods Detection methods 
 Paychecks for employees 
who: 
 Never take a vacation 
 Never take sick leave 
 Have no taxes withheld 
 Have no deductions 
 Have no social security 
number 
 Have social security 
number duplicated by 
another employee 
 Have no physical address 
 Have an address 
duplicated by another 
employee 
 Have no phone number 
 Have a duplicate phone 
number 
 Have a duplicate bank 
account  
 Have a date of paycheck 
after termination 
 Persons on the payroll 
who have no personnel file 
 Unexplained or unusual 
increase in wages expense/ 
commission expenses 
 Commission expenses 
increase as a percentage of 
total sales 
 Amount of uncollected 
sales/commissions/overtime 
generated by one employee 
is inordinately bigger 
compared to the coworkers 
 Fictitious/overstated sales 
 Mismatch in rates of pay/ 
hours worked data 
 Variations from budgeted 
expenses 
 Background and reference 
checks before hiring 
 Segregation of duties 
between hiring, payroll 
preparation, approval, 
disbursement, distribution 
and reconciliation 
 Restricted access to the 
payroll and personnel files 
 Policy requiring a 
supervisor’s approval of 
overtime work, pay 
changes, sick leave and 
vacation time 
 Examination of payroll 
files 
 Trend analysis 
 Reconciliation of 
employees in the payroll 
database with employees in 
the human resources 
database 
 Analyzing correlation 
between sales figures and 
commission expenses 
 Comparative analysis of 
uncollected sales/ 
commissions/overtime 
generated by employee 
 Getting independent 
confirmation of sales from 
customers 
 Comparing rates/hours 
paid with rates/hours stored 
in the personnel files 
 Comparing payroll 
expenses with budget 
projections 
 
reimburse expenses that are in fact fictitious or inflated (ACFE, 2012: 12). Companies 
usually reimburse expenses related to business travel, lodging and meals. Expense 
reimbursement typically implies the following process: an employee submits a report 
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detailing an expense together with the support documentation for the expense (e.g., 
receipt); a supervisor approves the report in order for the expense to be reimbursed 
(Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 371). Expense reimbursement schemes include 
mischaracterized expense reimbursements, overstated expense reimbursements, 
fictitious expense reimbursements, and multiple reimbursements (ACFE, 2012: 7). 
 
Mischaracterized expense reimbursement scheme occurs when an employee requests 
reimbursement for a personal, not business-related, expense. For instance, dinner with a 
friend is claimed as “business development”. The fraudster submits the expense report, 
providing business purpose for the incurred cost, but attaches the receipt from the 
personal spending. In this case, the false document makes a victim company reimburse 
the employee for the personal expense (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 371; ACFE, 
2007: 1.569). 
 
To prevent the scheme, a company should implement and enforce policy requiring the 
submission of detailed expense reports. Each document should describe the business 
purpose for the expense, time, date, location in which it incurred and exact amount. A 
simple review of the paper can reveal travel locations that are not known for business 
purposes. Also a comparison between the employee’s expense reports and the work 
schedule can expose whether “business” expenses coincide with a vacation or day off  
(ACFE, 2007: 1.569, 1.571; Vona, 2008: 139). 
 
Overstated expense reimbursement scheme commonly implies altering the price shown 
on the support documentation and submitting it along with the expense report. By 
changing the amount of expense to a higher one, an employee can pocket the difference. 
If the company policy does not require the original documents as support, the 
perpetrator can submit a photocopy to hide alterations (ACFE, 2007: 1.571). 
 
According to the scheme’s description, the fraud indicator involves altered support 
documentation, which can be concealed through the submission of photocopies. 
Obviously, to prevent the fraud, an employer should implement and enforce policy 
requiring original support documents to be attached to the expense report. In this case, 
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alterations can be detected through the detailed review of the documentation (ACFE, 
2007: 1.573, 1.577). 
 
Fictitious expense reimbursement scheme occurs when an employee “creates” business 
expenses that need to be reimbursed. There are several ways to generate a 
reimbursement for non-existed spending. One can make fraudulent support documents, 
e.g., counterfeit receipt printed out at home. The perpetrator can also obtain blank 
receipts from legitimate vendors, e.g., waiters, or steal them. One more way to conduct 
the scheme implies submission of the reports for expenses that were paid by others. All 
these manipulations cause a victim company to reimburse the perpetrator for business 
expenses not actually existed (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 375). 
 
Submission of sequentially numbered receipts, as well as receipts that are missing 
logical information might be a red flag of the scheme, since the fraud involves creation 
of fictitious support documentation. A detailed review of receipts sorted by employee 
and receipt number can detect such kind of anomaly (Seidler, 2011; Vona, 2008: 141). 
As before, to prevent the scheme, policy requiring original support documents to be 
attached to expense reports should be implemented and enforced (Wells, 2011: 236). 
 
Multiple reimbursements scheme involves submission of the same expense several 
times. The most common way to commit the fraud is to present various types of support 
documents for a single expense (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010: 377). If the company 
allows photocopies for expense items, the perpetrator might simply submit several 
copies of the same support document to receive multiple reimbursements (ACFE, 2007: 
1.577). In some cases, when two or more employees share expenses, each one might 
claim for reimbursement for the same expense (Vona, 2008: 140). 
 
According to the scheme’s description, the same expense claimed on multiple reports 
might represent a red flag. Therefore, a review of expense reports submitted by one 
employee can reveal the fraud (Goldmann, Kaufman, 2009: 84). Prohibiting 
photocopies and allowing only original documents as support can restrict the variety of 
manipulations. By implementing and enforcing policy that requires the claims to be 
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made within a specified time period, an employer can prevent multiple submission of 
expense (ACFE, 2007: 1.573, 1.577). 
 
Besides specific red flags attached to each type of the scheme, there are anomalies that 
can be caused by any of the expense reimbursement frauds. They include variations 
from budgeted expenses and unexplained or unusual increase in expense 
reimbursements (Wells, 2003). Such anomalies can be detected through expense 
account review, which involves trend analysis and comparisons with budgeted amounts, 
i.e., comparisons between actual and estimated expenses (ACFE, 2007: 1.577). At the 
same time, tracking down expense reimbursements gained by each employee allows to 
uncover if one has significantly bigger amount of these reimbursements compared to the 
coworkers. 
 
As for the fraud prevention, the basic control is segregation of duties between preparing 
expense reports, approving expense amounts and issuing related payments (Kimmel, 
Weygandt, Kieso, 2011: 343; Wells, 2011: 239). Another prevention measure is having 
restricted access to the approved expense reports, so that the employees who originally 
submitted the documents would not have further access to them (Bragg, 2011). Table 3 
recapitulates the red flags associated with the expense reimbursement schemes and 
methods of fraud prevention and detection. 
 
 
2.3. Asset misappropriation prevention and detection in Russian small 
business environment 
 
After examining billing, payroll and expense reimbursement schemes, highlighting 
anomalies caused by violations in question and defining fraud prevention and detection 
policies and procedures, the next step of the research is to put together the findings 
obtained from the literature and apply them in Russian small business environment. For 
this purpose, similar anti-fraud measures are combined and presented under either 
preventive or detective category. Whether a control belongs to one of the categories 
depends 
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Table 3. Expense reimbursement schemes 
Red flags Prevention methods Detection methods 
 Travel expense claims to 
locations that are not 
known for business 
purposes 
 Expense claims for days 
when the employee had a 
vacation or day off 
 Altered support 
documentation 
 Consecutively numbered 
receipts 
 Receipts that are missing 
logical information 
 Same expense is claimed 
on multiple reports 
 Unexplained or unusual 
increase in expense 
reimbursements 
 Variations from budgeted 
expenses 
 Amount of expense 
reimbursements gained by 
one employee is 
inordinately bigger 
compared to the coworkers 
 Policy whereby detailed 
expense reports are 
submitted with the original 
support documentation 
 Policy requiring the 
claims to be made within a 
specified time period 
 Restricted access to the 
approved expense reports 
 Segregation of duties 
between preparing expense 
reports, approving expense 
amounts and issuing related 
payments 
 Detailed review of 
expense reports and support 
documentation 
 Comparing the 
employee’s expense reports 
to the work schedule 
 Sorting receipts by 
employee and receipt 
number 
 Trend analysis 
 Comparing expenses with 
budgeted amounts 
 Comparative analysis of 
expense reimbursements 
gained by employee 
 
depends on the type of transactional event and where/how the control is initiated. Some 
detection procedures, if known to the relevant constituency, can take on preventive 
characteristics. For example, stock-taking is fundamentally detective control, as it is 
designed to reveal inventory discrepancy. However, when it is known that the procedure 
is conducted on a regular basis, it can also serve to prevent an unauthorized event 
(Bizzell, Clinton, Prentice, Stone, 2011: 22; Hightower, 2008: 44). 
 
In the research, anti-fraud measures are classified in the following way: preventive 
measures include practices attempted to stop irregularities from occurring; detective 
measures include procedures designed to identify anomalies in business. The final list of 
defense practices suggested by fraud literature (Goldmann, Kaufman, 2009; Goldmann 
2010; Vona, 2008; 2011; Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2010; Wells, 2001; 2002; 2003; 
2007; 2011; Coenen, 2008; 2009; Singleton, Singleton, 2010; ACFE, 2007; 2012; 
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Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht, Zimbelman, 2011; Johnson, Rudesill, 2001; Bierstaker, 
Brody, Pacini, 2006) is presented below: 
 
1. Background and reference checks before hiring refer to looking into criminal 
records, checking credit reports, verifying educational credentials and contacting prior 
employer (Goldmann, 2010: 87-88). Such safeguard not only ensures that the person 
hired is trustworthy, qualified and fits for the position, but also eliminates the possibility 
of adding a ghost employee to the payroll. 
 
2. Maintaining and regularly updating an approved vendor list assists in keeping 
information of all company’s active vendors. 
 
3. Verifying entity’s legitimacy before adding a new vendor to the approved vendor list 
assures that the entity in question is a bona fide company (Coenen, 2009: 123). 
Verification can be done, for instance, by looking up a company in telephone 
directories, obtaining its corporate records, visiting the address on file, etc. If a list of 
vendors is not in place, entity’s legitimacy can be checked before actual purchasing.  
 
4. Segregation of duties assures that different individuals are responsible for related 
activities. The key principle of the control is to separate the custodial, 
recording/reconciling, and approval functions throughout the company (Coenen, 2008: 
154). Such practice assists in reducing the temptation for an employee to commit a 
dishonest act. 
 
5. Restricted access to business records assures that only authorized persons have 
access to specific data. The safeguard can be implemented, for instance, through the use 
of login information to enter the system. 
 
6. Records management policy defines requirements for creating, processing and 
storing documents. In other words, the control assures that documents contain all the 
information needed to properly record and authorize the transaction, and are entered 
into the system as quickly as possible. 
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7. Use of authorization refers to establishing specific levels of authority, indicating 
who is permitted to initiate, approve and record transactions (Coenen, 2008: 155; 
Goldmann, Kaufman, 2009: 50). In the context of fraud prevention, the control is 
defined as a policy whereby authorized by level or position individuals sign off on 
transactions either by putting a signature on a paper or through the use of digital 
approval. 
 
8. Setting spending limits assures that disbursements will not go beyond the budgeted 
amounts (Bragg, 2009: 28-29). 
 
Although some fraud experts (e.g., Singleton, Singleton, 2010; Goldmann, 2010; Wells, 
2011; Coenen, 2008; ACFE, 2012) consider rotation of duties as a potentially good 
fraud prevention measure, the procedure has received the lowest rating of effectiveness 
in the survey by Bierstaker, Brody and Pacini (2006). Moreover, rotation of duties may 
be impractical for small businesses, as it takes resources that entities may not have to 
educate and train staff for the new tasks. 
 
Besides methods aimed to prevent the specific fraud schemes, there are few general 
cost-effective mechanisms that can be employed by small businesses. According to 
ACFE (2012), a code of conduct, employee training programs and fraud hotlines can be 
carried out at marginal costs in the organizations and can significantly increase 
prevention of fraud. In other words, by setting the bar for employee standards, 
educating staff on how to define and report illegal activities, and implementing an 
anonymous and confidential system to receive tips, small entity with limited resources 
can minimize the impact of fraud (Tysiac, 2012). Therefore, above-mentioned measures 
are included in the final list of defense practices. 
 
Procedures aimed at revealing fraud indicators are as follows: 
 
1. A stock-taking assures that the physical quantity of company’s assets equals the 
quantity in the books. For the purpose of detecting billing frauds, the procedure is 
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applied to inventory and fixed asset items. According to Russian Accounting Standards 
(RAS), the term inventory is addressed to assets: 
 
- used as materials, components, etc. in manufacturing products intended for sale 
(works, services); 
- intended for sale; 
- used for administrative needs of the entity24. 
 
In its turn, fixed assets include buildings, operating and power machines and equipment, 
measuring and control devices and equipment, computers, vehicles, tools, and many 
other objects intended for the use in product manufacturing, work performance or 
service provision, and for administrative needs of the organization25. 
 
2. Sorting documents refers to putting documents in a specific order. The procedure 
helps to detect red flags associated with false documentation. 
 
3. Detailed review of documentation assures that data and documents are complete and 
valid. 
 
4. Comparing vendor invoices with approved vendor list determines whether an 
invoice is received from an authorized vendor and whether the vendor’s data on the 
document is correct. 
 
Apart from invoices, Russian companies may deal with purchase orders when placing 
orders with vendors. Such documents represent the intention of buyer to acquire the 
exact goods or services from a single vendor, and contain all necessary purchase details 
(Deveau, Clough, 1999: 73). Therefore, by simply comparing the purchase order 
against the invoice and against the shipping documents, an employer can ascertain 
whether a transaction is valid (Goldmann, 2010: 102). 
                                                   
24 In Russia, accounting of inventory is regulated by Order of the Ministry of Finance № 44n. of 
09.06.2001. 
25 In Russia, accounting of fixed assets is regulated by Order of the Ministry of Finance № 26n. of 
30.03.2001. 
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5. Matching vendor data with employee data determines whether there are employees 
posing as vendors. 
 
6. Monitoring the nature and quantities of goods and services acquired assures that the 
types and quantities of purchased merchandise and services are reasonable. In this case, 
judgment is based on common sense and requires a good knowledge of business. 
 
7. Reconciliation of employees in the payroll database with employees in the human 
resources database shows if nonexistent employees or retaining terminated employees 
are presented on the payroll. 
 
8. Verifying the rates of pay in a pay period or for an employee over pay periods 
determines whether unauthorized rate changes are put on the payroll. At the same time, 
verification of hours worked shows if false hours are paid to an individual. 
 
9. Analytical review evaluates financial information for the presence of unexpected 
relationships, unusual changes and abnormal fluctuations. The data can be analyzed 
with the help of the following techniques. Trend (horizontal) analysis identifies changes 
in financial data over a number of accounting periods. Vertical analysis shows 
proportion of each separate figure on a financial statement and a base figure within the 
statement. Such technique, if applied over a number of periods, can help reveal unusual 
changes in the behavior of accounts. Comparison between actual and budgeted amounts 
determines variances between actual and planned results. Comparative analysis of 
results generated by unit shows if one has unusually high results compared to others. 
 
Limitation in the use of analytical procedures is that anomalous information in financial 
data does not necessarily indicate fraud and may simply require further analysis and 
investigation. In Russian business practice, the above-mentioned techniques are 
generally used under financial and business analysis. 
 
When looking into billing, payroll and expense reimbursement schemes, some 
similarities in the red flags and anti-fraud methods can be noticed. For example, all the 
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above violations cause a significant increase in spending that can be uncovered by 
performing trend analysis. Other detection methods that can be shared include 
confirmation of data and budget preparation. Since billing, payroll and expense 
reimbursement schemes involve fictitious or overstated spending, confirming the 
accuracy of relevant data can reveal the violations. And if in case of payroll fraud, false 
commissions are detected by confirming the sales, likewise billing and expense 
reimbursement schemes can be uncovered by checking expenditures incurred directly 
with the vendors (Goldmann, Kaufman, 2009: 132). The same is true for budgets – 
making comparisons between actual and expected results can reveal variances inherent 
not only for payroll and expense reimbursement schemes, but for billing frauds as well.  
If payments to a vendor substantially exceed the budgeted amount, this may be a sign of 
a shell company or non-accomplice vendor scheme. 
 
10. Confirming data accuracy with partners implies contacting customers/vendors to 
confirm the accuracy of payment/billing. The procedure determines whether fictitious or 
overstated sales/purchases take place. 
 
11. Comparing the employee’s expense reports and enclosed supporting documents to 
the work schedule allows to reveal whether the employee’s expenses occurred during 
vacation or day off. 
 
 
2.4. Theory summary 
 
Theoretical findings of the current study are shown in the Figure 3 that illustrates the 
relationship between examined fraud concepts. The triangle in the figure represents 
fraud conditions. When all three conditions are met, it is an opportunity to commit and 
conceal the dishonest act that leads up to the variety of crimes occurred inside the 
organization. Depending on the state of company’s internal controls, management 
oversight, and/or one’s position and authority, a perpetrator conducts the fraud scheme 
that he/she believes can not be detected under given conditions. Since pressure and 
rationalization are individual for each person, it may be difficult for management to do 
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anything about an employee’s needs or personal code of ethics. Therefore, business 
owners and executives should concentrate organization’s resources on reducing 
opportunity - the element that is manipulated the most - by building processes, 
procedures and controls that prevent insiders from committing fraud and that effectively 
detect illegal activity if it occurs. 
 
 
Figure 3. Fraud, its prevention and detection 
 
When a fraudster perpetrates crime, he/she usually leaves traces of concealed dishonest 
act. Such traces can be identified by means of controls established by management, tests 
conducted by auditors and other sources both internally and externally. However, the 
presence of red flags does not necessarily mean that fraud takes place, and can be 
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provoked by non-fraud factors. Therefore, analysis of indicators is performed to 
determine whether signals observed are sufficient to recommend an investigation. In 
case investigation is conducted, the extended procedures are applied to ascertain 
whether fraud, as suggested by the indicators, has occurred. 
 
Since some businesses lack an internal audit department and/or the resources to 
elaborate a strong set of internal controls, the focus of the research is put on the anti-
fraud program that management can establish to minimize the occurrence of fraud and 
increase the probability of its detection. Fraud issues are examined in the context of 
Russian small organizations, as economic crime, particularly asset misappropriation, is 
the great concern for such entities. Findings on the prevention and detection of the most 
common violations are illustrated in the Figure 4. 
 
Maintaining and updating an approved vendor list, segregation of duties, records 
management policy, code of conduct, etc. are examples of defense practices that can be 
utilized to manipulate the opportunity element of the fraud triangle. Additionally, design 
and implementation of the code of conduct can help limit other two fraud factors: 
employee’s ability to rationalize illegal activities by explaining organization’s principles 
and incentive to commit fraud by prompting a consideration of consequences. The 
employment of such prevention measures provides certain protection against white-
collar crime for a small enterprise. 
 
Audit procedures, e.g., stock-taking, employee reconciliation, document sorting, etc., 
are aimed at discovering the signs of asset misappropriation schemes. At the same time, 
the measures contribute to fraud deterrence by creating perception of detection. When 
the red flags are identified, either internal or external investigation is performed, 
followed by law enforcement and other segments of the criminal justice system that 
bring fraud perpetrator before the court. 
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Figure 4. Billing, payroll and expense reimbursement schemes, their prevention and 
detection in Russian small businesses 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The objective of this part is to justify and explain the choice of research methods used 
in the context of the research problem. The chapter presents the research design, a 
description of the sample, reliability and validity estimation. 
 
 
3.1. Research design 
 
For the purpose of answering the research question, a descriptive study is initiated to 
determine accountants’ and managers’ personal and subjective perceptions regarding 
effectiveness of anti-fraud policies and procedures. In this work, descriptive design is 
used to discover the characteristics of a given population, not to test theory. The paper 
reports on the current state of anti-fraud measures usage in Russian small businesses 
and presents summary data on effectiveness of the measures in preventing and detecting 
white-collar crime. Additionally, comparison between accountants’ and managers’ 
responses is made, and difference in their opinions is identified. 
 
The study uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches to research. Analysis of 
written materials provides qualitative information on the fraud issues, which is later 
used in the questionnaire to find out details on the topic in the given context. Thereafter, 
quantitative value is ascribed to qualitative data to make it amenable to further analysis. 
By adopting a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, the study 
provides precise and testable expression to qualitative ideas. 
 
 
3.1.1. Content (conceptual) analysis26 
 
The purpose of conducting content (conceptual) analysis is to answer the research sub-
question 1: what measures do fraud experts recommend to prevent and detect billing, 
payroll and expense reimbursement schemes? In this connection, fraud literature is 
                                                   
26 http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/page.cfm?pageid=1309 
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reviewed for the presence of fraud prevention and detection measures. In particular, 
articles, books and other papers on corporate fraud, fraud auditing and investigation, 
and forensic accounting are scrutinized to determine defense practices and audit 
procedures aimed to combat billing, payroll and expense reimbursement schemes (see 
Table 4). 
 
The content analysis is performed in the following way27. Each red flag and associated 
detection method found in the work of one fraud expert is tested for the presence in the 
works of other authors. If either a red flag or detection method is missing in one 
publication, it is searched, at first, among other works of the same author, and then, if it 
is not found, in the works of other authors. The same procedure is conducted in respect 
to prevention methods. 
 
Whether a measure is applicable for the further research depends on how many times it 
is mentioned by different fraud experts. For the purpose of creating an extensive list of 
anti-fraud methods, the chosen frequency equals to 3, meaning that at least 3 authors 
have mentioned the method either independently or in collaboration. After such a 
selection, anti-fraud measures are checked for the usability in Russian small businesses 
by eliminating complex practices and procedures and focusing on those that can be 
performed on a regular basis as a part of employee duties. Thereafter, the paper 
examines which of the remained methods work “the best”. The results of the content 
analysis are presented in the paragraph 2.3 of the thesis. 
 
 
3.1.2. Survey design 
 
Due to the need for information on the effectiveness of fraud prevention and detection 
methods that could be applied in small businesses, a survey-based research is conducted 
to build a database for analytical purposes. In particular, the study describes how 
managers 
                                                   
27 The coding choices are made with respect to the coding steps indicated by Carley (1993). In the current 
research, the data is coded in terms of existence in the works of different fraud experts and then later 
collapsed to frequencies. 
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Table 4. Fraud literature 
Author Title Year 
1. Johnson, Gary G., Rudesill, 
Charryl L. 
An investigation into fraud prevention and 
detection of small businesses in the 
United States: responsibilities of auditors, 
managers, and business owners 
2001 
2. Wells, Joseph T. Enemies Within 2001 
3. Wells, Joseph T. 
Billing Schemes, Part 1: Shell Companies 
That Don’t Deliver 2002 
4. Wells, Joseph T. Billing Schemes, Part 2: Pass-Throughs 2002 
5. Wells, Joseph T. 
Billing Schemes, Part 3: Pay-and-Return 
Invoicing 2002 
6. Wells, Joseph T. 
Billing Schemes, Part 4: Personal 
Purchases 2002 
7. Wells, Joseph T. Keep Ghosts Off the Payroll 2002 
8. Wells, Joseph T. The Padding That Hurts 2003 
9. Wells, Joseph T. Protect small business 2003 
10. Bierstaker, James L., Brody, 
Richard G., Pacini, Carl 
Accountants’ perceptions regarding fraud 
detection and prevention methods 
2006 
11. Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners 
Fraud Examiner’s Manual 2007 
12. Wells, Joseph T. 
Fraud Casebook: Lessons from the Bad 
Side of Business 
2007 
13. Coenen, Tracy Essentials of Corporate Fraud 2008 
14. Vona, Leonard W. 
Fraud Risk Assessment: Building a Fraud 
Audit Program 
2008 
15. Coenen, Tracy 
Expert Fraud Investigation: A Step-by-
Step Guide 
2009 
16. Goldmann, Peter D., 
Kaufman, Hilton 
Anti-Fraud Risk and Control 2009 
17. Goldmann, Peter D. 
Financial Services Anti-Fraud 
Risk and Control Workbook 
2010 
18. Kranacher, Mary-Jo, Riley, 
Richard, Wells, Joseph T. 
Forensic Accounting and Fraud 
Examination 
2010 
19. Singleton, Tommie W., 
Singleton, Aaron J. 
Fraud Auditing and Forensic Accounting 2010 
20. Albrecht, Conan C., 
Albrecht, Chad O., Albrecht, W. 
Steve, Zimbelman, Mark F. 
Fraud Examination 2011 
21. Vona, Leonard W. 
The Fraud Audit: Responding to the Risk 
of Fraud in Core Business Systems 
2011 
22. Wells, Joseph T. 
Corporate Fraud Handbook : Prevention 
and Detection 
2011 
23. Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners 
Report to the Nations on Occupational 
Fraud and Abuse 
2012 
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managers and accountants perceive effectiveness of anti-fraud methods and what 
methods are actually used in their organizations. Next, the information is analyzed, and 
conclusion is made on whether the entities employ the most or the least effective 
techniques. 
 
The survey method of data collection was selected due to several reasons. First, surveys 
are good at dealing with specific issues, when the researcher knows in advance precisely 
what kind of information is needed. Second, the surveys are best suited to gathering 
data on relatively straightforward, relatively uncomplicated facts and thoughts. Third, 
surveys are good at collecting information about a large number of people (Denscombe, 
2010: 12). In the context of the current research problem, there is no need to conduct in-
depth investigation, which is suited to really complex issues; the required information is 
clearly identified based on study sub-questions; it is desirable to obtain mass data on the 
subject to come up with reliable results. 
 
For the purpose of this study, a cross-sectional design is used to assess availability of 
fraud prevention and detection methods in small businesses and gather opinions of 
insiders on their effectiveness at a single point in time. In other words, data collection 
occurred only once. Longitudinal design was not applied, as the research agenda does 
not require repeatedly collected data. 
 
Since it is practically impossible to measure the entire target population, a sample 
survey is conducted to obtain information of sufficient quality in a fast and economic 
way. In particular, convenience sampling was applied to question subjects that are close 
to hand. Regardless of the fact that convenience samples facilitate easy, inexpensive and 
fast data collection, they carry possible bias and limits on generalization of the results, 
due to non-random manner of selection (Krishnaswami, Satyaprasad, 2010: 53, 56). 
And though it is difficult to make inferences about the population, while using such a 
subjective method of selection, the current research can serve as a basis for further 
extensive survey. In this case, convenience sampling can be useful for gaining rough 
impression about the subject of interest. 
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In order to obtain data on a research subject, questionnaires are allocated among 
managers and accountants. One of the advantages of using a questionnaire is 
comparability of collected data between different respondent groups and over the course 
of time. Also, it is cost-effective, quick and well suited to extracting information from a 
large number of people (Kaptein, Avelino, 2005). The disadvantage is that the 
researcher may never know if the respondent understood the question that was being 
asked. Additionally, questionnaires may produce very low return rates, whether they are 
mail or online questionnaires (Krishnaswami, Satyaprasad, 2010: 121; McDonald, 
Adam, 2003). 
 
The current research questionnaire consists of two individual parts. The first part 
includes questions aimed at obtaining demographic information on the respondents. The 
second part examines managers’ and accountants’ perceptions regarding effectiveness 
of anti-fraud measures and includes a rating scale to determine the prevalence of 
respondents’ opinions. Responses range from “completely ineffective” to “completely 
effective” with seven total answer options. Each option is assigned a score (1 = 
completely ineffective to 7 = completely effective), and these scores are used in survey 
response analysis. The research on the reliability and validity of scale scores suggests 
that the optimal number of response categories in rating scales lies between 7 and 10 
options (Preston, Colman, 2000). 
 
In order to encourage people to answer questions about themselves and give their 
opinions, a brief statement, explaining the purpose of the survey and reassuring about 
the anonymity of the obtained information, is presented at the top of the questionnaire. 
Also, fraud-related terms are explained, and interpretation of anti-fraud measures is 
provided to ensure that the collected responses are valid. 
 
Both parts of the questionnaire are first developed in English and then translated to 
Russian. These versions are compared and some changes are made. To check the 
relevance and the construct of the survey instrument, it is tested by having one senior 
accountant and one senior manager review and fill in the questionnaire before it is 
distributed to the sample. As a result, some modifications in the wording are made. Both 
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English and Russian versions of the questionnaire are presented in Appendix 3 and 
Appendix 4 respectively. The average time required for a respondent to complete the 
survey is about ten minutes, which is both adequate to the data collection objectives and 
fast enough to avoid potential respondent’s loosing interest due to an excessive demand 
of their time. 
 
Distribution of the questionnaire is made though the use of electronic mail, most 
commonly referred to as e-mail, which is relatively fast and inexpensive alternative to 
the post (McDonald, Adam, 2003). At the same time, it can be fast and easy secondary 
distribution based on an appropriate request in the message for forwarding to other 
potential respondents (Bonometti, Tang, 2006). Additionally, e-mail surveys code the 
data automatically, eliminating the hand-coding, and therefore save the researcher time 
and resources (Cobanoglu, Warde, Moreo, 2001). 
 
The current survey is conducted by sending the questionnaire as an attachment in an e-
mail. The main advantage of this method is the ability to give to the questionnaire a 
format and appearance that will be inviting and pleasing to the research participants 
(Gunter, Nicholas, Huntington, Williams, 2002). 
 
The limitation of electronic survey is that some people may be quite selective when 
reading their e-mails and, as a result, may ignore certain types of e-mails considering 
them as “junk mail” or spam (Bonometti, Tang, 2006). It is also hard to ensure the 
respondents’ anonymity: when individuals return questionnaires, they reveal personal 
identity through their e-mail addresses and network routes. Additionally, the content of 
response is virtually accessible by Internet intruders. The lack of anonymity could be a 
factor that discourages some people from participating in surveys using the new 
medium because of security and privacy concerns (Dommeyer, Moriarty, 1999; 
Ranchhod, Zhou, 2001). Another drawback involves the use of e-mail attachments that 
are associated with the risk of introducing computer viruses. If the potential respondent 
fears getting a virus from downloaded files, he/she may be reluctant to take part in the 
study (Dommeyer, Moriarty, 1999; Gunter, Nicholas, Huntington, Williams, 2002). The 
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lack of tangible incentives via electronic surveys is also seen as one of the limitations of 
using this method (Ranchhod, Zhou, 2001). 
 
In order to increase the response rate and speed to e-mail study (Sheehan, Hoy, 1999; 
Sheehan, 2001), survey invitation and follow-up message are sent to potential 
participants. Survey invitation used in this research is presented both in English and 
Russian in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively. The first e-mail is sent in June 
2013. It includes a short letter, disclosing information about the research, and two 
attachments. The main objective of the letter is to motivate recipients to participate in 
the survey. The recipients are asked to respond to the questionnaire within one week. 
Reminder message (similar to that in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2) is sent to those who 
have not answered within the given time. The recipients are asked again to respond to 
the questionnaire within one week. 
 
Originally, the questionnaire is constructed in DOC format. In order to simplify its 
filling, check boxes are implemented, allowing the respondents to mark options within 
the Word document. A PDF format of the questionnaire is also attached to the e-mail, in 
case someone is experiencing difficulties in using check box instrument or having a 
word processor that can not “read” the DOC file. Three recipients used this option and 
returned the questionnaire by attaching the scanned document to an e-mail reply. 
 
 
3.2. Sample 
 
The sample of the current research is represented by accountants and managers of 
Russian small businesses – organizations with less than 100 employees. In total, 14 
business practitioners (7 accountants and 7 managers) participated in the study. In an 
attempt to obtain sufficient for analysis amount of data in a short time, multiple 
techniques were used to get into touch with the potential respondents. Thus, nine survey 
participants were found through the private contacts within Russian social network 
(vk.com/). Five practitioners were reached through the initial respondents, meaning that 
questionnaire was forwarded further by individuals to others from the target population. 
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Seventy-one percent of the survey participants hold a specialist’s degree, twenty-nine 
percent have a master’s degree. 57 percent work at organizations with 1-15 employees, 
43 percent work at organizations with 16-50 employees. Practitioners come from 
different industries, such as manufacturing (29 percent), construction (29 percent), 
wholesale and retail trade (29 percent) and services (13 percent). Overall, respondents 
are diverse in terms of age, years of experience, organization size and industry. A 
summary of these results is presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Demographic data 
Number of respondents Percentage 
Respondent's occupation: 
Accountant 7 50 
Manager 7 50 
 
Respondent's age: 
25 to 34 years 12 86 
45 to 55 years 1 7 
above 55 years 1 7 
 
Respondent's educational level: 
Specialist's degree 10 71 
Master's degree 4 29 
 
Respondent’s experience in occupation: 
0 to 4 years 7 50 
5 to 9 years 5 36 
10 to14 years 1 7 
more than 20 years 1 7 
 
Main business activity: 
Manufacturing 4 29 
Wholesale and retail trade      4 29 
Construction 4 29 
Services 2 13 
 
Organization size: 
1-15 persons 8 57 
16-50 persons 6 43 
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Overall, 12 organizations were examined for the presence of anti-fraud methods. 
Because of small organization size, only the most appropriate contact person was 
selected from each entity. In 11 organizations either manager or accountant participated 
in the survey. In 1 organization 3 managers responded to the questionnaire. The reason 
for inquiring multiple managers lied in the diversity and complexity of the entity’s 
operations. 
 
The survey response rate comprises 100 %, meaning that all recipients agreed to 
participate in the study and returned the questionnaire. Moreover, all responses 
appeared to be usable for analysis. The research does not have any missing values due 
to response examination straight after the questionnaire is returned. If missing data is 
noticed, the recipient is contacted and asked to provide necessary information promptly. 
 
The primary selection criterion, which was used to form a sample for the research, 
involved an easy access to each potential respondent by e-mail or through the social 
network. Due to the fact that private contacts with managers and accountants were 
established mainly in Saint-Petersburg educational institutions, the majority of the study 
participants had limited working experience at the time of conducting the survey. Thus, 
the research sample restricts the inclusion of the potential respondents with more years 
of practice. Moreover, the current selection does not contain organizations with 51-100 
persons in staff and therefore, there is no evidence on the use of anti-fraud measures in 
such entities. 
 
It is possible that more experienced managers and accountants who were left out during 
the selection process might have different perception regarding effectiveness of fraud 
prevention and detection measures. As a result, their responses might affect the study 
outcome. Indeed, Johnson and Rudesill (2001) in their work indicated that experience is 
an influencing factor in how accountants rate the effectiveness of certain defense 
practices. Thus, there is a risk that data received from the less experienced survey 
participants might differ from those given by individuals with more years of practice. 
Additionally, organizations with 51-100 employees, due to larger size, might have more 
safeguards in place as compared to the examined entities. All this leads to the 
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proposition that there might be a difference between the results from the current study 
and the results from the entire population. 
 
 
3.3. Reliability and validity 
 
The important aspects of the accuracy of the results are reliability and validity. In order 
to ensure reliability of managers’ and accountants’ answers, the questionnaire is self-
administered and all respondents receive similar questions which are tested for wording. 
Additionally, close-ended questions are utilized to provide survey participants with a set 
number of options. At the same time, a Likert scale, intended to measure respondents’ 
opinions, ensures the easiness of answering. 
 
The validity of the results is achieved by questioning managers and accountants about 
known anti-fraud measures. The data received from respondents is well matched to the 
research question of the study, as it bears the scores that are later used to conclude on 
the most effective and ineffective fraud prevention and detection techniques. 
Additionally, the questionnaire provides an explanation of the basic fraud terminology 
and interpretation of defense practices and audit procedures. Such information reduces 
the possibility of an incorrect understanding of the questions by respondents. Moreover, 
to make managers and accountants perceive the survey as non-threatening and thus, 
enhance validity of their answers, the results of the study are interpreted on a general 
level to guarantee the anonymity of any individual organization. The use of optimal 
number of response categories (i.e., 7 options) in a Likert scale also positively affects 
validity. 
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4. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY 
 
The objective of this part is to summarize and interpret data in a way that provides a 
clear answer to research question. 
 
 
4.1. Use and effectiveness of fraud prevention and detection methods 
 
Based on the fraud literature review (see Table 4 for a list of references), accountants 
and managers were asked to indicate whether their organizations used the following 
defense practices: restricted access to business records, spending limits, records 
management policy, approved vendor list, vendor’s legitimacy verification, segregation 
of duties, authorization for transactions, code of conduct, background and reference 
checks, fraud hotline, fraud detection training (see Table 6 for data on the frequency 
usage of the safeguards). In addition, respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of 
these measures in preventing fraud on a scale from 1 (completely ineffective) to 7 
(completely effective). Figure 5 presents the results. 
 
Table 6. Use of fraud prevention methods 
N Fraud prevention methods 
Frequency, 
% 
1 Restricted access to business records 75 
2 Setting spending limits 67 
3 Records management policy 67 
4 Maintaining an approved vendor list 58 
5 Verifying vendor’s legitimacy 58 
6 Segregation of duties 58 
7 Use of authorization 50 
8 Code of conduct 42 
9 Background and reference checks before hiring 33 
10 Educating staff on fraud detection 17 
11 Fraud hotline 8 
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To sum up the effectiveness scores assigned by survey participants, mean and standard 
deviation are applied. The mean is computed as the sum of all the observed outcomes 
from the research sample divided by the total number of events. Thus, it helps identify 
where the center of the data set is. One problem with using the mean is that it can be 
strongly affected by an outlier28. Therefore, the population standard deviation is used to 
determine the amount of dispersion of data for those who participated in the study. 
Since the research sample is non-random, statistical analysis can not be conducted. 
Hence, sample standard deviation is not computed. 
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Figure 5. Effectiveness of fraud prevention methods 
 
As shown in Table 6, the most frequently used defense practices are restricted access to 
business records (75 percent), spending limits (67 percent) and records management 
                                                   
28 Outcome that is very far from the rest of the data. 
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policy (67 percent), while the least frequently used are fraud hotline (8 percent) and 
fraud detection training (17 percent). Meanwhile, according to Figure 5, respondents 
rated having restricted access to business records in organization as the practice most 
effective in preventing fraud, with a mean score of 6.36 and standard deviation of 0.69. 
This finding is similar to that presented in the work of Johnson and Rudesill (2001), 
where controlled access to assets and records was among the most effective fraud 
prevention measures. At the same time, fraud detection training received the lowest 
mean value of 4.43 with the standard deviation of 1.45 and thus, was rated by survey 
participants as the practice least effective in preventing illegal activities. However, Andi 
McNeal, the ACFE’s director of 2012 research, highly recommended this technique (see 
Tysiac, 2012), stating that “if done properly, anti-fraud training program can save an 
organization lots of resources both in the short and the long run”. 
 
Interestingly, the most frequently met among examined entities defense practice 
received the highest rating of effectiveness, while one of the least frequently met 
received the lowest rating of effectiveness. One explanation for this might be that 
accountants and managers have more confidence in the practices, in which they are 
involved, than in those they did not have a chance to apply and therefore, form a 
definite opinion on. As to the perceptions of different respondent groups, accountants 
agree with managers that having restricted access to business records is the most 
effective fraud prevention measure. However, managers in this study gave the lowest 
rating of effectiveness to confidential employee fraud hotline, while accountants 
considered fraud detection training as the least effective defense. 
 
Based on the fraud literature review (see Table 4 for a list of references), survey 
participants were asked to indicate whether their organizations used the following audit 
procedures: sorting documents, data confirmation with vendors/customers, review of 
documentation, comparing the purchase order against the invoice and against the 
shipping documents, monitoring the nature and quantities of goods and services, 
comparing expense reports and enclosed supporting documents to the work schedule, 
comparing vendor invoices with approved vendor list, stock-taking of inventory and/or 
fixed asset items, financial and business analysis, matching vendor data with employee 
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data, reconciliation of employees in the payroll database with employees in the human 
resources database, hours worked and/or the rates of pay verification (see Table 7 for 
data on the frequency usage of procedures). In addition, accountants and managers were 
asked to rate the effectiveness of these measures in detecting fraud on a scale from 1 
(completely ineffective) to 7 (completely effective). Figure 6 summarizes the results. 
 
Table 7. Use of fraud detection methods 
N Fraud detection methods 
Frequency, 
% 
1 Sorting documents 100 
2 Data confirmation with vendors/customers 100 
3 Review of documentation 92 
4 
Comparing the purchase order against the invoice and against the 
shipping documents 
83 
5 Monitoring the nature and quantities of goods and services 83 
6 
Comparing expense reports and enclosed supporting documents to 
the work schedule 
83 
7 Comparing vendor invoices with approved vendor list 75 
8 Stock-taking of inventory and/or fixed asset items 75 
9 Financial and business analysis 75 
10 Matching vendor data with employee data 58 
11 
Reconciliation of employees in the payroll database with employees 
in the human resources database 
58 
12 Hours worked and/or the rates of pay verification 50 
 
As shown in Table 7 and Figure 6, hours worked and/or the rates of pay verification is 
the least frequently used among examined entities audit procedure (50 percent), with 
considerably low mean effectiveness rating of 5.36 and standard deviation of 1.11. 
Detection procedures, such as sorting documents and data confirmation with 
vendors/customers, were implemented in all participants’ organizations (100 percent). 
At the same time, both measures received a high effectiveness rating, with a mean of 
6.00 and 6.29 and standard deviation of 1.00 and 0.80 respectively. 
 
Respondents rated comparing purchase order with invoice and with shipping documents 
and confirming data with vendors/customers as the most effective. Ranked least 
effective was matching vendor data with employee data. Interestingly, stock-taking 
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procedure did not receive very high effectiveness score in the current research. 
However, in the work of Johnson and Rudesill (2001), testing physical inventory was 
rated as one of the most effective. 
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Figure 6. Effectiveness of fraud detection methods 
 
Overall, audit procedures that are frequently met in organizations received high ratings 
of effectiveness, while measures that are not so common in small businesses received 
low ratings of effectiveness. As to the perceptions of different respondent groups, 
managers and accountants agree on giving high effectiveness rating to the procedures, 
such as confirming data with customers/vendors and comparing purchase order with 
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invoice and with shipping documents. However, accountants rated matching vendor 
data with employee data as the least effective fraud detection measure, while managers 
gave the same lowest effectiveness score to both employees’ reconciliation and hours 
worked and/or the rates of pay verification procedures. 
 
In general, respondents are more confident in fraud detection techniques than in defense 
practices. Also there is no significant difference in how accountants and managers 
perceive the overall effectiveness of anti-fraud methods listed in the study. Only few 
examined small-scale enterprises had sufficient amount of defense practices and audit 
procedures in place to protect their business from asset misappropriation schemes. 
Surprisingly, organizations with 1-15 employees applied fraud prevention and detection 
measures more frequently than organizations with 16-50 employees. Overall, audit 
procedures were more commonly used by small entities than defense practices. 
 
To sum up, by describing data on the use of fraud prevention and detection methods in 
the examined entities, this section provides an answer to the research sub-question 2: 
what measures do Russian small businesses have in place to prevent and detect billing, 
payroll and expense reimbursement schemes? Additionally, the paragraph presents 
effectiveness ratings of fraud prevention and detection methods given by managers and 
accountants of small organizations and thus, responses to the research sub-question 3: 
how do managers and accountants estimate effectiveness of the measures in preventing 
and detecting billing, payroll and expense reimbursement schemes? 
 
 
4.2. Discussion and recommendations 
 
It was expected that small organizations would have little resources to devote to fraud 
prevention, thus availability of anti-fraud measures should be limited. In fact, analysis 
of the use of defense practices and audit procedures indicates that at the examined 
entities many basic safeguards were under-utilized. Thus, the current research agrees 
with the previous studies, such as ACFE (2012), Bierstaker, Brody and Pacini (2006), 
that small organizations are reluctant to invest in anti-fraud measures. 
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Unlike the works that focus on the costly control mechanisms, this paper is addressed to 
defense practices and audit procedures that provide an appropriate cost/benefit balance 
for small businesses. Indeed, the measures selected during literature analysis are highly 
recommended by fraud experts to organizations with limited resources. For instance, 
ACFE (2012) emphasizes the cost-effectiveness of fraud hotlines, code of conduct and 
anti-fraud training programs. Such measures can be easily implemented in Russian 
small entities at a marginal cost and can greatly increase the ability to prevent and detect 
fraud. Nevertheless, despite the potential effectiveness, only few examined 
organizations had employee training and fraud hotline in place and less then half of the 
organizations established code of conduct. The reason for this could be that business 
owners may underestimate the potential benefits of the safeguards in terms of cost 
savings from reduced losses related to fraud. 
 
It is also possible that organization’s management is unable to adequately implement 
anti-fraud measures and therefore, may doubt the necessity of such techniques in the 
business. As one survey participant noticed: “Implementation of certain safeguards may 
require additional costs. However, there is a risk that even being detected, the fraud 
incident will stay unreported.” 
 
Another reason, why small entities under-utilize fraud prevention and detection 
techniques, could lay in the nature of organization’s business and complexity of the 
operations. For example, some service companies may not have any fixed assets in 
possession and may apply just-in-time inventory system (i.e., having the right material, 
at the right time, at the right place, and in the exact amount), thus, lacking or having a 
very low inventory level. In this situation, stock-taking of inventory and fixed asset 
items is an unnecessary procedure. Additionally, due to the small-scale of operations, 
some entities, particularly those with up to 15 employees, may not have certain 
processes, e.g., expense reimbursement. Thus, the lack of claims leaves no chance for 
the fraud and therefore, safeguards in this area are not required. 
 
It is also possible that Russian small organizations have little controls in place due to 
friendly and trustworthy working environment. As one survey participant noticed: “In 
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Russia, 90% of relationship in small business is built on trust”. In fact, it is common for 
small entities to have nepotism29 in the workplace and as a result, under-utilize certain 
policies and procedures, e.g., background and reference checks. However, even if 
business owner prefers to hire the person recommended by a current employee, having 
too much trust and too little safeguards poses a threat to the welfare of small enterprise, 
as trust can be easily abused by a dishonest individual. 
 
Working conditions could also be the reason for poor use of anti-fraud measures in 
Russian small businesses. Indeed, having employees working in one or two adjoining 
offices allows to stay abreast of all the conversations. Therefore, organization’s 
management might have a perception that in such circumstances it is hard for anyone to 
commit and conceal illegal activities. However, numerous fraud cases described in the 
literature show that small businesses that do not have basic controls in place are 
particularly vulnerable to deception, since perpetrator can easily find a loophole in the 
present environment. 
 
Because small organizations are the most in need of protection from white-collar crime, 
the current paper provides some recommendations on the use of basic and cost-effective 
fraud prevention techniques: 
 
1. Instead of using an anonymous telephone hotline as the fraud reporting mechanism, 
small businesses can implement cheaper alternatives to gather information about 
potential fraud and other concerns. For example, a traditional suggestion box can be 
constructed to receive paper feedback. Another option is to create a Web form to deal 
with online messages. 
 
2. Anti-fraud training program does not have to be expensive. At a minimum, staff can 
be educated about what constitutes fraud, what signs should alert one to the suspicious 
activity and how to report it. 
 
                                                   
29 A favoritism shown by the company to the relatives or friends of the employer or the owner. 
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3. Organization’s code of conduct can have a simple design and content. Moreover, the 
cost of instituting a code can be essentially limited to the expense required for the labor 
to implement it. The document can address the following general issues and topics: 
employee conduct while at work; conflicts of interest; confidentiality; relationships with 
customers and suppliers; unethical behavior; etc. 
 
4. It is possible to achieve appropriate segregation of duties in organizations with a 
small number of employees. For example, in entities with 3 persons on staff, invoices, 
time sheets/salary amounts and expense reimbursement claims can be approved by 
business owner. Office manager can be responsible for preparing and processing 
documents, while accountant – for recording transactions. Payments to vendors and 
employees can be again arranged by business owner. 
 
5. Before hiring an employee, small business owner or human resources manager can, at 
a minimum, contact a former employer. Additionally, resumes can be scrutinized and 
information verified to determine its legitimacy. 
 
6. Verification of the vendor’s legitimacy can be conducted by simply finding any 
evidence that the entity exists in reality, e.g., checking company’s website for a physical 
address or a phone number. Additionally, one can “Google” a company to get to know 
more about who they really are behind the superficial image. 
 
7. Authorization procedures should be enforced in purchase, payroll and expense 
reimbursement transactions. An authorization control in the purchasing area can be 
implemented, e.g., by having a policy that any transaction over certain amount must be 
approved by business owner or senior manager. 
 
To sum up central survey results, examined Russian enterprises are not interested to 
invest in anti-fraud methods. This could be due to the fact that: 1) organization’s 
management puts too much trust in employees, underestimates fraud opportunities in 
present conditions, has a doubt about cost-effectiveness of defense practices and audit 
procedures, or experiences difficulties in implementing measures in the business; 2) 
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organization may not need certain policies and procedures, in view of business nature 
and simplicity of the operations. 
 
It was expected that small enterprises would be more likely to have cheap anti-fraud 
measures than expensive ones. However, the survey results show that even simple and 
inexpensive defense practices and audit procedures are under-utilized in such entities. 
This suggests that small business owners and managers may be unaware of the threat of 
white-collar crime or underestimate its scope and impact on the organization’s welfare. 
 
It was expected that managers’ and accountants’ perceptions regarding effectiveness of 
fraud prevention and detection methods would vary slightly due to difference in 
education and professional experience. In fact, the survey did not expose significant 
variance in respondents’ estimations. Overall, anti-fraud measures received almost the 
same rank order of effectiveness on behalf of accounting and management practitioners. 
Also, these respondent groups gave pretty much the same ratings of total effectiveness 
of defense practices and audit procedures. 
 
Finally, during the survey it was expected to answer the research question: what 
measures are effective in preventing and detecting billing, payroll and expense 
reimbursement schemes in Russian small businesses? The results of the study show that 
the most effective fraud prevention technique that could be used in Russian small-scale 
enterprises is having restricted access to business records, while the most effective fraud 
detection measures are data confirmation with customers/vendors and comparing 
purchase order with invoice and with shipping documents. At the same time, all these 
measures were among the most frequently met in the examined organizations. Complete 
information on the use and effectiveness of other anti-fraud policies and procedures is 
presented in the paragraph 4.1 of the thesis. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study investigates the extent to which Russian small organizations use various 
fraud prevention and detection methods, as well as managers’ and accountants’ 
perceptions regarding their effectiveness. In particular, the research focuses on asset 
misappropriation schemes that pose a great threat to small businesses in Russia and 
presents a list of basic and inexpensive methods to combat illegal activities, which are 
later examined for the effectiveness and presence in the organizations. 
 
The survey results suggest that document sorting and data confirmation with 
vendors/customers are the most commonly used measures to detect fraud. However, 
comparing the purchase order against the invoice and against the shipping documents is 
less often used, despite receiving the high rating of effectiveness. Meanwhile, restricted 
access to business records is the most frequently met preventive practice, which has also 
the highest ranking among anti-fraud measures. In general, defense practices and audit 
procedures that are commonly employed have received the high effectiveness scores. 
Thus, it can be concluded that although small entities have little policies and procedures 
in place, those that are implemented in the business are considered effective. 
 
The research has practical implications for small business management. It provides 
prescriptive information on what fraud prevention and detection methods work the 
“best”. Additionally, it suggests that some basic safeguards are not used and may be 
underestimated in terms of effectiveness. Small business owners and managers may 
wish to consider implementing effective methods, in order to prevent fraud schemes in 
their organizations. 
 
The paper has some limitations. First, the findings of this study cannot be generalized 
beyond the examined Russian small-scale enterprises. Therefore, there is a risk that the 
results from the study might differ significantly with the results from the entire 
population. Second, new potentially effective anti-fraud measures could remain 
unnoticed, due to method of selection that focuses on the policies and procedures 
recommended by at least three fraud experts. 
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Taking into account the above limitations, future extensive studies may address the 
issues of fraud prevention and detection to Russian small- and large-scale organizations 
independently. Moreover, due to insufficient amount of information on behalf of 
Russian body of the research, statistics on the fraud incidents, perpetrators and losses 
due to illegal activities may be collected, in order to raise awareness of white-collar 
crime among Russian business owners and managers. Apart from the local surveys, 
future study may extensively examine fraud prevention and detection of small 
organizations on an international level. Additionally, future research may investigate 
protection of small entities from the infrequent, but costly fraud schemes. 
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APPENDIX 1: SURVEY EMAIL INVITATION 
(IN ENGLISH) 
 
Dear managers and accountants of small enterprises, 
 
I am inviting you to participate in the business survey on occupational fraud and 
methods of its prevention and detection. Data collected during the survey will be used in 
my thesis project, which is aimed at defining the “best” practices in the fight against 
illegal activities. Once the work is complete, the respondents will be able to become 
acquainted with the research results, if desired. 
 
All responses will be kept completely confidential. Your name will not be attached to 
any results, and all the findings will be presented in a summary format. The 
questionnaire is user-friendly, and you should be able to complete it within 10 minutes 
or less. 
 
I kindly ask you to fill in the questionnaire (attached) with regard to your organization 
and send it to the e-mail ekaterina.milyutina@gmail.com. I would appreciate your 
response by 14 of June. 
 
Best regards, 
Milyutina Ekaterina 
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APPENDIX 2: SURVEY EMAIL INVITATION 
(IN RUSSIAN) 
 
Уважаемые менеджеры и бухгалтера малых предприятий, 
 
Приглашаю Вас принять участие в опросе, посвященном теме мошенничества 
персонала в организациях и методам его обнаружения и предотвращения. 
Собранные в результате опроса данные будут использованы в моем дипломном 
проекте, цель которого – выявить “лучшие” методы борьбы с противоправными 
действиями. По завершению работы, респонденты смогут ознакомиться с 
результатами исследования, если того желают. 
 
Все ответы останутся строго конфиденциальными. Ваше имя не будет 
упоминаться в связи с результатами, и все полученные данные будут 
представлены в составе общих итогов. Анкета поддерживает дружелюбный 
интерфейс, что позволяет заполнить ее в течение 10 минут или меньше. 
 
Любезно прошу заполнить анкету (прилагается) в отношении Вашей организации 
и прислать ее на адрес ekaterina.milyutina@gmail.com. Буду признательна, если Вы 
ответите до 14 июня. 
 
Всего наилучшего, 
Милютина Екатерина 
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APPENDIX 3: THE RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
(IN ENGLISH) 
 
Thank you in advance for your voluntary participation. The purpose of this survey is to 
gather data on the use of fraud prevention and detection measures in organizations and 
estimation of their effectiveness. It should take approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
All responses you provide are confidential and will be compiled into general findings. 
Information specific to you or your organization will not be identified. 
 
Fraud is an illegal act committed by people inside the organization for their own 
purposes or enrichment, and which results in losses of company’s assets (e.g., cash). 
Fraud prevention measures include practices attempted to stop irregularities from 
occurring. 
Fraud detection measures include procedures designed to identify anomalies in 
business. 
 
Respondent profile 
Present job title: 
 Accountant      Manager 
 Other (please specify_________________________________________________) 
 
Age: 
 under 25 years      25-34 years      35-44 years      45-55 years      
 above 55 years 
 
Highest educational level obtained: 
 Bachelor's degree      Specialist's degree      Master's degree  
 Other (please specify_________________________________________________) 
 
How long have you been in your current position: 
 under 5 years      5-9 years      10-14 years      15-20 years      
 above 20 years 
 
Main business of your organization: 
 Manufacturing      Wholesale and retail trade      
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 Construction      Services      
 Other (please specify_________________________________________________) 
 
Number of full-time employees in your organization: 
 1-15 persons      16-50 persons      51-100 persons      
 
Fraud questions 
1. Does your organization have the following defense practices in place? How 
would you estimate effectiveness of each measure (regardless of its use in your 
organization)? 
Please indicate below what measures are really in place in your business, and how 
you estimate effectiveness of each measure from the list in preventing fraud from 1 
(completely ineffective) to 7 (completely effective). 
 
Alternatives:       1 – Completely ineffective 
2 – Mostly ineffective 
3 – Somewhat ineffective 
4 – Neither effective nor ineffective 
5 – Somewhat effective 
6 – Mostly effective 
7 – Completely effective 
 
Maintaining and regularly updating an approved 
vendor list (i.e., a list of vendors considered as acceptable 
to buy from together with files, containing key company 
information) 
 
Verifying entity’s legitimacy before adding a new 
vendor to the approved vendor list or before actual 
purchasing (e.g., obtaining entity’s certificate of the state 
registration, checking the validity of entity’s address, etc.) 
 
Setting spending limits (e.g., setting the maximum 
amount for entertainment expenses) 
 
Segregation of duties (i.e., different people are 
responsible for the custodial, approval and 
recording/reconciling functions) 
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Background and reference checks before hiring (i.e., 
verifying educational credentials, contacting prior employer, 
etc.) 
 
Restricted access to business records (e.g., the use of 
login information to enter the system) 
 
Use of authorization (i.e., approval provided by 
authorized person for conducting inquired transactions) 
 
Records management policy (i.e., a set of rules that 
outline requirements for creating, processing and storing 
documents) 
 
Code of conduct (i.e., a set of rules that clarify legal and 
ethical grounds of conducting business transactions to 
employees) 
 
Educating staff on fraud detection 
 
Fraud hotline (i.e., an anonymous and confidential system 
to receive tips from different sources about potential fraud 
and other concerns) 
 
 
2. Does your organization have the following audit procedures in place? How 
would you estimate effectiveness of each measure (regardless of its use in your 
organization)? 
Please indicate below what measures are really in place in your business, and how 
you estimate effectiveness of each measure from the list in detecting fraud from 1 
(completely ineffective) to 7 (completely effective). 
 
Alternatives:       1 – Completely ineffective 
2 – Mostly ineffective 
3 – Somewhat ineffective 
4 – Neither effective nor ineffective 
5 – Somewhat effective 
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6 – Mostly effective 
7 – Completely effective 
 
Matching vendor data with employee data (e.g., 
comparing phone numbers, bank accounts, etc.) 
 
Comparing vendor invoices with approved vendor 
list 
 
Comparing the purchase order against the invoice 
and against the shipping documents 
 
Stock-taking of inventory and/or fixed asset items 
(i.e., comparing the physical quantity of company's assets to 
the quantity in the books) 
 
Monitoring the nature and quantities of goods and 
services acquired (i.e., judging the reasonableness of types 
and quantities of purchased merchandise and services) 
 
Reconciliation of employees in the payroll database 
with employees in the human resources database 
 
Verifying hours worked and/or the rates of pay (i.e., 
comparing hours/rates paid with hours/rates presented on 
employee time sheets/stored in the personnel files) 
 
Conducting financial and business analysis (e.g., 
trend (horizontal) analysis, vertical analysis, analysis of 
variances between actual and planned (budgeted) amounts, 
etc.) 
 
Sorting documents (i.e., putting documents in a specific 
order) 
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Detailed review of documentation (i.e., check of data 
and document validity and completeness) 
 
Confirming with customers/vendors the accuracy of 
payment/billing 
 
Comparing expense reports and enclosed 
supporting documents (i.e., documents that prove the 
incurred expenses) to the work schedule 
 
 
Thank you! 
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APPENDIX 4: THE RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
(IN RUSSIAN) 
 
Благодарим заранее за Ваше добровольное участие. Цель данного опроса – 
собрать данные об использовании мероприятий по предотвращению и 
обнаружению мошенничества внутри организации и оценки их эффективности. 
Заполнение анкеты занимает приблизительно 10 минут. Все Ваши ответы 
являются конфиденциальными и будут представлены в составе общих 
результатов. Информация, касающаяся лично Вас или Вашей организации, 
раскрытию не подлежит. 
 
Мошенничество - это противоправное действие, совершаемое людьми внутри 
организации в своих личных целях или в целях своего обогащения, и приводящее 
к потерям активов компании (напр., денежных средств). 
Меры по предотвращению мошенничества включают в себя практики, 
направленные на предотвращение нарушений. 
Меры по обнаружению мошенничества включают в себя процедуры, 
разработанные для обнаружения аномалий в бизнесе. 
 
Профиль респондента 
Настоящая должность: 
 Бухгалтер      Менеджер 
 Другое (пожалуйста, укажите_________________________________________) 
 
Возраст: 
 до 25 лет      25-34 лет      35-44 лет      45-55 лет      
 свыше 55 лет 
 
Высший полученный уровень образования: 
 Степень бакалавра      Степень специалиста      Степень магистра  
 Другое (пожалуйста, укажите_________________________________________) 
 
Как долго Вы работаете в занимаемой должности: 
 до 5 лет      5-9 лет      10-14 лет      15-20 лет      
 свыше 20 лет 
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Основная деятельность Вашей организации: 
 Производство      Оптовая и розничная торговля      
 Строительство      Предоставление услуг     
 Другое (пожалуйста, укажите_________________________________________) 
 
Численность сотрудников, работающих на полную ставку в Вашей 
организации: 
 1-15 чел.      16-50 чел.      51-100 чел.      
 
Вопросы о мошенничестве 
1. Какие из нижеследующих превентивных практик применяются в Вашей 
организации? Как бы Вы оценили эффективность каждого мероприятия 
(независимо от его использования в Вашей организации)? 
Пожалуйста, укажите, какие мероприятия действительно используются в 
Вашем бизнесе, и как Вы оцениваете эффективность каждого мероприятия из 
списка в предупреждении мошенничества от 1 (полностью неэффективный) до 
7 (полностью эффективный). 
 
Варианты:          1 – Полностью неэффективный 
2 – По большей части неэффективный 
3 – В некоторой степени неэффективный 
4 – Ни то, ни другое 
5 – В некоторой степени эффективный 
6 – По большей части эффективный 
7 – Полностью эффективный 
 
Ведение и регулярное обновление 
утвержденного списка поставщиков (т.е., списка 
поставщиков, в соответствии с которым разрешено 
производить закупки, а также ключевой информации о 
предприятиях)  
Проверка юридической легитимности 
предприятия перед добавлением нового 
поставщика в утвержденный список 
поставщиков или перед фактической закупкой 
(напр., запрос свидетельства о государственной 
регистрации предприятия, проверка достоверности 
юридического адреса предприятия и т.д.) 
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Введение ограничений по расходным 
операциям (напр., утверждение максимальной суммы 
представительских расходов) 
 
Распределение должностных обязанностей при 
осуществлении отдельной деловой операции 
(т.е., разделение функций инициализации операции, 
авторизации и ведения/согласования счетов)  
Проверка анкетных данных и рекомендаций 
кандидатов при приеме на работу (т.е., проверка 
подлинности аттестатов, установление контакта с 
предыдущим работодателем и т.д.)  
Ограниченный доступ к деловым записям 
предприятия (напр., использование пароля для входа в 
систему) 
 
Авторизация деловых операций (т.е., разрешение, 
предоставляемое уполномоченным лицом для проведения 
запрашиваемых операций) 
 
Регламент/инструкция по делопроизводству 
(т.е., набор правил, устанавливающих требования к 
созданию, организации движения, учету и хранению 
рабочих документов) 
 
Кодекс делового поведения (т.е., свод правил, 
разъясняющих сотрудникам юридические и 
нравственные принципы ведения деловых операций) 
 
Обучение персонала навыкам распознавания 
фактов мошенничества 
 
Горячая линия по вопросам мошенничества (т.е., 
анонимная и конфиденциальная система для получения 
мгновенных сообщений из различных источников о 
любом потенциальном акте мошенничества и других 
угрозах)  
 
2. Какие из нижеследующих аудиторских процедур применяются в Вашей 
организации? Как бы Вы оценили эффективность каждого мероприятия 
(независимо от его использования в Вашей организации)? 
Пожалуйста, укажите, какие мероприятия действительно используются в 
Вашем бизнесе, и как Вы оцениваете эффективность каждого мероприятия из 
списка в обнаружении мошенничества от 1 (полностью неэффективный) до 7 
(полностью эффективный). 
 
Варианты:          1 – Полностью неэффективный 
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2 – По большей части неэффективный 
3 – В некоторой степени неэффективный 
4 – Ни то, ни другое 
5 – В некоторой степени эффективный 
6 – По большей части эффективный 
7 – Полностью эффективный 
 
Сопоставление реквизитов поставщиков с 
данными персонала (напр., сравнение телефонных 
номеров, номеров банковских счетов и т.д.) 
 
Сопоставление данных полученных счет-фактур 
с данными утвержденного списка поставщиков 
 
Сопоставление содержания полученной счет-
фактуры с заказом на покупку и 
товаросопроводительными документами 
 
Инвентаризация материально-
производственных запасов и/или основных 
средств (т.е., выявление фактического наличия 
имущества предприятия и сопоставление с данными 
бухгалтерского учета)  
Контроль характера и количества 
приобретаемых товаров и услуг (т.е., оценка 
обоснованности типа и количества закупаемых товаров и 
услуг)  
Сверка сотрудников, находящихся в базе 
данных заработной платы, с сотрудниками, 
находящимися в базе данных персонала 
 
Верификация отработанных часов и/или ставок 
заработной платы сотрудников (т.е., сравнение 
данных об оплаченных трудовых часах/ставках с 
данными о трудовых часах/ставках, указанными в табеле 
учета рабочего времени/хранящимися в личном деле 
сотрудника) 
 
Анализ финансово-хозяйственной деятельности 
предприятия (напр., проведение трендового 
(горизонтального) анализа, вертикального анализа, 
анализа отклонений фактических показателей от 
плановых (сметных) и др.)  
Сортировка документов (т.е., упорядочение 
документов определенным способом) 
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Детальная проверка документации (т.е., проверка 
данных и документов на предмет достоверности и 
полноты) 
 
Проведение сверок взаимных расчетов с 
контрагентами (т.е., обращение к контрагентам с 
целью подтверждения состояния взаимных расчетов на 
определенную дату)  
Сопоставление дат авансовых отчетов и 
приложенных оправдательных документов (т.е., 
документов, подтверждающих произведенные расходы) с 
рабочим графиком  
 
Спасибо! 
 
